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Aid transaction costs in the education sector: the case of Zambia 
Zambia is one of the poorest, most heavily indebted and most aid dependent countries in 
Africa. Between 2000 and 2002, Zambia received an annual average of $595m in net 
ODA; in 2002 ODA represented 18% of national income, and over 40% of total public 
expenditure. 43% of the education budget is externally funded, and more than 60% of 
the budget for basic education. In recent years, the top five donors in volume terms have 
been the World Bank, IMF, EC, Japan and UK. In total, some eighteen official donors 
are currently active, or have recently been active in the Zambian education sector. 
 
Zambia faces some of the region’s greatest human development challenges. Its HIV-
AIDS infection rate has reached 21%, and health indicators have declined markedly in 
recent years. The education system suffers from extremely low quality, and inadequate 
access, especially in rural and peri-urban areas. Over 600,000 primary aged children are 
estimated to be out of school, and today’s generation of teenagers are more likely to 
reach adulthood unable to read and write than their parents’ generation. The HIV-AIDS 
pandemic has contributed severely to educational decline, by impacting both on the 




After fifteen years of steep educational decline, in 1994 the World Bank initiated 
discussions on the introduction of a sector wide approach to education development, or 
Sector Investment Programme, that would encompass the work of all four ministries 
involved in education and training. Previously, aid to education had been provided 
through individual donor projects, resulting both in a piecemeal approach to the massive 
education challenges facing Zambia, and in onerous multiple administrative, technical 
and management costs for the government. The underlying rationale of the SIP was 
twofold - to achieve comprehensive strategic progress by aligning donor and country 




In response, the government revised its education policy in 1996, called ‘Educating Our 
Future’, with a view to it forming the basis of a SIP. However, in 1997 attempts to 
establish an education SIP broke down – largely because of the complications of working 
with different ministries, and because of donor concerns about government capacity and 
commitment. In its place two sub-sectoral programmes were established for basic 
education and vocational education. The four year Basic Education Sub-Sector 
Investment Programme (BESSIP) was launched in 1999, with a view to establishing a full 
Sector Wide Approach, or SWAp, in 2003/04.  This case study will discuss the BESSIP 
and the subsequent Ministry of Education Sector Plan – introduced this year – in turn, 
and trace the evolution of key administrative and financial transaction costs over the 
course of the two programmes. 
 
                                                 
1 The key study of Sector Investment Programmes is Peter Harrold (World Bank, 1995) ‘An exploration of 
Sector Investment Programmes with guidance for their further development’   2
The principal goal of the BESSIP was to arrest and reverse the deteriorating education 
system in Zambia. Nine components were identified – infrastructure, teacher 
development, teacher deployment and compensation, materials, equity, health and 
nutrition, curriculum, decentralisation, and HIV-AIDS. But in the course of delivering 
these components, it was expected to significantly change how donors and government 
worked together on the ground and make aid more effective. Together with the health 
sector, education was regarded as a key testing ground for a new ‘partnership’ approach 
to aid that involved the following key characteristics: 
-  strong government ownership, in place of a donor driven reform agenda 
-  pooled or basket funding, initially at a sector level, with a longer term view to 
direct budget support and pooled technical assistance 
-  harmonised reporting, financial and procurement procedures among donors 
-  alignment with country systems and procedures  
 
Coordination and participation in BESSIP 
Zambia receives education aid from at least twenty official donors,
2 and this poses major 
challenges in terms of managing transaction costs. Fifteen donors provided some form 
of support to the BESSIP, and their involvement was coordinated through a number of 
planning groups and committees. Perhaps the greatest initial challenge was building 
sufficient trust to get donors to start relinquishing the visibility, tight financial monitoring 
and ability to earmark that come from running projects. A critical element in building this 
trust was the establishment of financial management, procurement and monitoring and 
evaluation systems that could improve transparency and accountability, with the state of 
public financial management in the ministry a particular donor concern. The fact that 
BESSIP coincided with a decentralisation programme further complicated efforts at 
coordination, with several donors citing its slow progress as a cause of bottlenecks in 
making progress towards a full Sector Wide Approach.
3 
 
In order to build donor confidence in the capacity and commitment of government, a 
management system separate from existing ministry structures was created, with 
‘BESSIP’ staff reporting directly to a series of committees jointly convened by 
government and donors (see table 1). Overall responsibility for the BESSIP lay with a 
Joint Steering Committee that met twice yearly and functioned as a ‘high level’ forum for 
policy dialogue between the Education and Finance Ministries and senior donor 
representatives. A programme coordinating committee meeting 6 times a year provided 
in-depth oversight of the programme and managed a Management Implementation team 
responsible for generating twice yearly audits, quarterly progress reports, annual and 
semi-annual reviews and occasional evaluations, as well as coordinating Technical 
Assistance expenditures, organising meetings, workshops and seminars and supervising 
BESSIP activities across the ministry. In 2003 the MIC was subsumed into the ministry, 
in an effort to cut back on parallel structures, while the PCC has been renamed the 
strategic programme coordinating committee as Zambia has moved towards a full 
SWAp.  
 
A financial committee and a task team comprising four donor representatives and four 
government officials (later expanded to ‘6+6’) reported directly to the PCC and were 
responsible for overseeing financial management, and with supporting the preparation of 
reviews and reports respectively. A more ad hoc committee tasked with addressing equity 
                                                 
2 Including UNICEF, UNESCO and UNDP 
3 IHSD, ‘Sector Wide Approaches in Education’, August 2003.   3
and gender issues was also established, while the ministry established a system of 
informal – often bilateral – meetings with lead donors such as the World Bank and 
DFID, in an effort to build consensus and confidence. According to ministry of 
Education officials spoken to in the course of the research, these processes - while 
onerous and involving considerable start up costs - did improve donor coordination. 
Whereas at the start of the BESSIP each participating donor insisted on individual 
reporting procedures, these became much more harmonised over the course of the 
programme, with the six bilateral donors that have pooled funding now using 
standardised reports. As the programme evolved, the BESSIP was seen less as a World 
Bank initiative, and monthly donor coordination meetings have built strong bilateral 
ownership of the programme, at least among the poolers who sat on the PCC and the 
‘6+6’ group. 
 
 Table 1: Administrative transaction costs in the BESSIP 
meeting frequency  outputs  participation 
Joint Steering 
Committee 
Twice yearly  •  Policy formulation 
•  Approval of work plans and budgets 
•  Oversight of implementation 
•  Coordinating donor funds 
•  Reviewing reports 
Minister of Education, 
senior MoE 
management, Ministry 







•  Coordinate workplans and budgets 
•  Monitor MIC 
•  Coordinate Technical Assistance 







weekly  •  Preparation of budgets and reports 
•  Supervision of activities 
•  Organise semi-annual and annual reviews, PCC 






weekly  •  Financial management  Donors, MoE staff, 
BESSIP accounting unit 
6+6 task team  weekly  •  Preparation of reviews, reports, audits  6 senior MoE staff, 6 
donor representatives 
Equity and gender 
committee 









The Financial Technical Committee and 6+6 team reported directly to the PCC 
 
Ministry officials also reported that the BESSIP had fostered a ‘culture of systematic 
planning’ that was previously missing, with the reports and reviews encouraging a more 
evidence-based approach to policy, and the setting of realistic targets and detailed 
budgets. Meanwhile regular meetings were felt to have created a more open climate of 
information-sharing and critical discussion. Less positively, parallel structures were 
created until the Ministry directorates were restructured to the satisfaction of donors, 
allowing the Management Implementation committee to be disbanded. While 
coordination was felt to have reduced overall administrative transaction costs, 
respondents also felt that these costs had been concentrated, with senior ministry staff 
spending very large amounts of time in formal and informal meetings with donor 
representatives.
4 Attempts to promote local ownership and reduce donor 
micromanagement have also sometimes faltered. For example, a programme evaluation 
carried out by Zambian consultants in 2002  was rejected at the Annual Review meeting, 
                                                 
4 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. ‘Local Solutions to Global Challenges: Towards Effective 
Partnerships in Basic Education’. Final report, September 2003   4
and a 2003 Dutch-Canadian study, part of a four country survey, supplanted the first 
evaluation. 
 
Financing arrangements in BESSIP 
From its outset, the government’s preferred financing modality for the BESSIP was 
pooled funding, with a single agreed system of reporting and accounting. At the same 
time, donor confidence in the quality of ministry public financial management was low, 
and many donors cited administrative or legislative obstacles as preventing them from 
providing pooled funding (the EC is the only donor to provide direct budget support to 
Zambia at the present time). There was an initial attempt by MoE to get donors to sign  
up to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a Joint Statement of Intent in 1999, 
which failed partly because of what were seen by donors as unrealistic demands in the 
text to move swiftly to a full SWAp. The UK Department for International was one 
donor that, having agreed in principle to provide pooled funding for the sector, pulled 
back from this position in 2000 until further fiduciary safeguards were provided and a 
stronger track record of successful implementation was established.
5 
 
Initially, only four bilateral donors agreed to channel money through a basket under the 
control of the ministry, although this was held in parallel accounts. The government 
responded by identifying three other financing options, which in effect were a post-hoc 
rationalisation of what donors happened to be doing. These four cases are identified in 
table 2. In all, eleven donors provided funding under 16 different modalities. In addition, 
a further eight donors provided some form of assistance to the sector outside the 
BESSIP – much of it to secondary or tertiary education and through separate ministries. 
 
Table 2: Funding arrangements under BESSIP in 2001 
Case arrangement  %  of  aid  Donors 
1  Pooled funding controlled by ministry  34%  Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, UK 
2  Funds in separate accounts, controlled by 
ministry, for all activities 
World Bank 
3  Funds in separate accounts, controlled by 
ministry, for earmarked activities 
Ireland, Netherlands, ADB 




Denmark, Finland, Japan, UK, US, UNICEF 
Source: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
A number of pre-existing projects were nominally brought under the BESSIP umbrella 
in cases three and four (see table 3). Some of these had their own implementation units 
in the ministry and persisted over the lifetime of the BESSIP, with some donors such as 
the Danes, the British and the Finns funding both under cases 1 and 4. Several donors 
justified this by arguing that projects gave donors direct feedback from the ground on 
BESSIP’s progress, suggesting that donors were hedging their bets on whether to align 
fully with government processes. The ability to directly manage technical assistance 
budgets, and thereby keep a strong degree of influence over sector planning, was a 
further motivation. Regardless of the underlying factors, the ongoing burden of 
managing multiple projects in BESSIP was considerable, and the combination of project 
and programme approaches is likely to have increased overall transaction costs for 
government, at least in the medium term.  
 
For the ministry’s part, by incorporating projects within the BESSIP it hoped that donors 
would be persuaded to ‘upgrade’ over time to pooled funding. For donors, pooled 
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funding had the attraction of giving them privileged access to the key planning processes, 
such as the PCC and the ‘6+6’ group, something that government was able to use as an 
incentive (the ‘insider’/‘outsider’ split among donors was also cited as a weakness of the 
BESSIP). In 2003, another donor started to provide pooled funding while the volume of 
funding has also risen from $19m in 1998 to $40m in 2001 and a projected $87m in 
2004, evidence of growing donor confidence in government’s ability to deliver on key 
sectoral goals. 
 
Table 3: projects under BESSIP, 2001 
Donor Project  activity 
African Development Bank  Civil works through ZEPIU 
DANIDA  CDC, Zonal Resource Centres, Teacher Education 
DFID  Teacher Resource centres, Reading Programme 
FINIDA  Education Sector Support Programme Phase 3: Infrastructure, 
Special Education, capacity building, learning materials, HIV-
AIDS 
JICA School  construction 
Netherlands  Western Province Education Project 
NORAD  Education Information Management System (EMIS), School 
construction and rehabilitation, capacity building activities 
OPEC  Civil works through ZEPIU 
UNICEF  PAGE project, Community schools project, HIV-AIDS, life skills 
project, WASHE 
USAID  EMIS, SHN, Gender and Equity, IRI, CHANGES 
Source: LT Associates 
 
The establishment of a separate TA-funded BESSIP accounting unit in the Ministry of 
Education, headed by a senior accountant, was a key step in building this confidence. 
The unit reported to the Ministry’s chief accountant, and included a ‘BESSIP finance 
manager’ who maintained regular communication with the donors. The budget 
expenditure monitoring system that was created allowed donor disbursements to be 
tracked to cost centres, but was not integrated into MoE or MoF systems – precluding 
joint financial and performance audits. An internal audit department in the ministry was 
responsible for a twice-yearly audit of all BESSIP transactions, and for reports to the 
Permanent Secretary and PCC. At the same time, the Auditor General has been 
responsible for an overall audit of BESSIP, which generally satisfied pool donors. The 
only significant concerns about mismanagement of funds occurred at the local level, and 
were usually acted upon decisively by the Ministry.  
 
































While BESSIP resulted in modest but important progress on the ground – enrolment 
and retention rates have improved, ratios of teachers and textbooks to students have   6
fallen, and test scores have slightly improved – implementation generally lagged behind 
plans. Several donors have attributed this to lack of government capacity, but slow donor 
disbursements seem to be a further cause (see figure 1). In general, the Zambian 
government has made available the resources approved by parliament, whereas donor 
disbursements have stood at about 50% of pledges in the budget. The reasons for this 
gap are unclear, but probably reflect in part bureaucratic delays in donor agencies, and a 
lack of standardised procedures and sequencing between donor and government 
budgets.
6 That only two donors – Finland and the UN – provide regular updates to the 
government on actual disbursements further complicates the picture. Slow procurement 
procedures – especially where donors have attempted to make use of government 
systems, as with textbook purchases – have also been cited as a source of delayed 
disbursement, and a reason for a lack of harmonisation in this area.
7 
 
The difficulties posed by unstable donor flows are exacerbated by a lack of predictability 
in donor funds. This is a particularly urgent problem in education, where achieving the 
MDGs will require a major scaling up of recurrent costs – especially for teacher salaries – 
that cannot be easily reversed. While the government of Zambia is planning against a five 
to ten year horizon, only 4 donors in Zambia – Denmark, the EU, UN and USAID – are 
providing details of 3 year indicative envelopes they expect to release. According to 
ministry officials, these problems persist despite the new commitments made by donors 
under the sector wide approach. 
 
Moves to a Sector Wide Approach 
BESSIP had been designed with the intention of graduating to a comprehensive sector 
plan with pooled donor support. The strategic planning process for a new five year 
education plan, to run from 2003 to 2007, started in early 2001 with a public 
consultation. This new plan was expected to reflect the decentralisation and restructuring 
of Zambian education, which was finalised in 2000, and the 2002 Zambian Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that was a condition of debt relief under the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country Initiative, and which identified education as one of the key 
development priorities for the country.  
 
Table 4: donor commitment to harmonisation efforts 
Harmonisation MoU  Education MoU 
Donor signatories  Non-participating 
donors 







































The sector plan covers the education sub-sectors, from basic to tertiary, and also 
addresses early childhood education and adult literacy (although these two areas continue 
to be managed by separate ministries). In contrast to BESSIP, where the key themes 
were not reflected in the ministry structure, all the programmes are coherent with the 
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new Ministry line functions, while financial management procedures have been 
established with the eventual aim of integration into the main ministry accounts. 
According to ministry officials, the main source of this delay is the slow progress of a 
new Medium Term Expenditure Framework by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Following a visit to Lusaka by the Director Generals of ‘like-minded’ bilateral donors, as 
follow-up to the Rome aid harmonisation agenda adopted by the OECD-DAC in 2002, 
Demark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, UN and World 
Bank signed on to an MoU to support a common framework for ‘Harmonisation in 
Practice’ (see table 4). The education and health sectors were selected as the test grounds 
for an accelerated push to harmonise donor practices, reduce transaction costs and 
increase aid effectiveness. The key commitments made in the MoU were to: 
-  deliver aid in line with needs and priorities identified in the PRSP 
-  Align with Zambian government budgets, financial systems and monitoring 
-  Address institutional capacity constraints that undermine donor confidence in 
use of these systems 
-  Review the number of missions, reviews, reports and conditions, with the aim of 
reducing transaction costs for the Zambian government 
-  Promote coordination and harmonisation at all levels 
-  Work towards silent partnerships between donors where possible 
-  Improve information sharing 
-  Clarify the donor division of labour around PRSP themes 
Table 5: External Education Funding by Modality, 2004 




% of Total 
Budget 
DCI 10,249,292  49,196,602  11.7%  4.2% 
Norway 12,000,000  57,600,000  13.8%  4.9% 
DFID 10,100,000  48,480,000  11.6%  4.1% 
Netherlands 6,000,000  28,800,000 6.9%  2.5% 
Finland 2,400,000  11,520,000 2.8%  1.0% 





Sub-total 41,959,292  201,404,602  48.1%  17.1% 
World Bank  8,462,434  40,619,683 9.7%  3.5% 
EC 2,923,556  14,033,069  3.4%  1.2% 
UNICEF 3,079,000  14,779,200 3.5%  1.3% 
Japan (JCVF)  1,222,005  5,865,624  1.4%  0.5% 
Denmark 5,700,000  27,360,000 6.5%  2.3% 




Sub-total 29,933,191  143,679,317  34.3%  12.2% 
USAID 6,000,000  28,800,000 6.9%  2.5% 
Denmark 1,500,000  7,200,000 1.7%  0.6% 
Finland (TA fund)  600,000  2,880,000  0.7%  0.2% 
JICA 1,565,714  7,515,427  1.8%  0.6% 
DFID 4,800,000  23,040,000 5.5%  2.0% 
DFID (TA Fund)  480,000  2,304,000  0.6%  0.2% 
EC-ZECAB 395,000  1,896,000  0.5%  0.2% 




Sub-total 15,340,714  73,635,427  17.6%  6.3% 
TOTAL 87,233,197  418,719,346  100%  35.6% 
Source: Zambia Ministry of Education 
 
In the education sector, a joint Memorandum of Understanding was signed at the same 
time between the government and eight donors, including the World Bank and 
UNICEF, that sets out actions to deliver on these objectives and attempts to establish   8
some measure of mutual accountability by creating procedures for handling disputes in 
the Joint Steering Committee, which now meets quarterly and includes donor heads of 
mission. The administrative and financial arrangements for the new sector plan are 
largely a continuation of what existed under BESSIP. Two of the most significant 
changes are that government is now formally restricting donor membership of the 
Strategic Programme Coordinating Committee to donors that have pooled their funding, 
while further efforts have been made to streamline funding arrangements under three 
cases (see table 5).  
 
Under the pooled funding arrangement, donors are continuing to deposit money in a 
common parallel account, although this is under the management of the ministry. Before 
these releases are made, a number of measures must be taken, including a donor review 
of Annual Work Plans and budgets, an agreed financial commitment by the government 
to spend at least 20.5% of the discretionary annual budget on education, the publication 
of a quarterly disbursement forecast, approved quarterly financial and progress reports, 
and the receipt of a formal request for funds from the MoE, copied to the Ministry of 
Finance. 
Figure 2: Donor Missions in 2003
















Under the ‘designated support funds’ bilateral agreements between individual donors and 
the MoE govern the allocation of resources, although any donor financed activities under 
this or the ‘other support fund’ category are expected to be in line with the objectives 
and priorities set out in the National Implementation Framework (NIF). At the same 
time, managing financial and administrative relations with such a large donor group 
poses major challenges to a severely resource-constrained country such as Zambia. In all, 
there are twenty different donor funding lines supporting the sector plan for 2004, 
ranging from under $400,000 to $12m.  These are being provided by a heterogeneous 
group of agencies with widely differing approaches to the harmonisation agenda, about 
which some donors - such as the US and Japan - are highly sceptical. To date, there has 
been no formal discussion about whether the number of donors active in the sector 
should be reduced in a bid to lower transaction costs for government, or about how this 
could take place without reducing overall external support to education. There are a small   9
number of ‘silent partnerships’ in Zambia, where donors channel funds through another 
agency, reducing the number of interlocutors with government, but these have been 
limited to the agriculture sector, and funding for Quasi-Non-Governmental 
Organisations and NGOs. 
 
Government officials report that the administrative burden of financial oversight has 
increased significantly as Zambia has moved from BESSIP to the sector wide plan, partly 
because this has been a precondition of a major increase in donor resources under the 
SWAp, and partly because the scope of programme coverage has increased with a full 
sector plan. Perhaps the largest administrative cost has resulted from the creation of 
budget tracking mechanisms and administrative structures down to the provincial level, 
as part of a common Financial Management System. The Auditor General’s office has 
also reported a marked increase in workload as a result of donor demands in relation to 
the education and health SWAps. While many of these changes are doubtless bringing 
much needed fiduciary accountability to bear on the education system, there remain 
questions about whether an unrealistic burden is being placed on the ministry, and to 
what extent donors – rather than the government – stand to be the prime beneficiaries of 
many of the harmonisation measures. 
 
Administrative transaction costs are monitored by donors and government through the 
Strategic Plan support group and the Financial Technical Committee, which were 
established under the BESSIP. Generally, progress towards harmonised donor missions 
and reviews, and procurement has been especially slow. In 2003, 120 donor missions 
took place to Zambia across all sectors, excluding the World Bank and IMF. Of these, 
just 12 were joint missions involving more than one donor, with the UN, US, EU, 
Norway, Sweden and Finland failing to participate in any joint missions (see figure 2). In 
the education sector, several key donors that have pooled resources, including Norway 
and Denmark, have so far failed to conduct any joint missions. Although several joint 
missions have now taken place in the education sector, ministry officials continue to cite 
their length and frequency as a problem, since they occupy the time of senior staff for 
two to three weeks at a time, thereby diverting energy from effective management of the 
sector plan. A similar picture emerges in relation to the use of joint reviews, where aside 
from a cross-sectoral Public Expenditure Review, there have been no major diagnostic 
studies supported by the donor group and government. 
 
Procurement accounts for more than 50% of the SWAp budget, mainly allocated to 
construction, rehabilitation and learning materials, although a large share - over $1m in 
2004 - has also been allocated to Technical Assistance for capacity building and financial 
and information systems management. Although definite information was difficult to 
obtain, ministry officials reported that a large share of this was formally tied to purchase 
of goods and services from the relevant donor country. Donor and government 
perspectives on procurement differ: donors argue that government systems are unwieldy 
and untransparent, while government argues that managing numerous donor 
procurement procedures leads to administrative overload and slows disbursement. These 
differences mirror donor and government perceptions of the extent to which local 
systems are being used. A recent Development Assistance Committee (DAC) study 
found that whereas donors claimed that 52% of procurement expenditure utilised 
country systems, government respondents claimed that this applied to only 10% of 
donor spending. The true figure is likely to be somewhere between these two poles, but 
their disparity suggests a lack of shared understanding of what alignment and 
harmonisation means on the ground. It is also probably reflects the fact that many   10
‘country systems’ have in fact been designed and developed by donors – often through 
TA budgets – in the course of programme implementation, and for this reason are not 




The BESSIP and subsequent sector plan in Zambia have made significant progress in 
terms of education outcomes, where declining access and quality has been arrested and is 
starting to be reversed. They have also started to deliver on another, related objective, 
which is to improve the coherence of education planning, funding and delivery, and to 
increase levels of external support. However, given that the Zambia education SWAP is 
often cited by donors as being at the outer limits of good practice, the modest progress 
towards harmonisation needs to be put in perspective. Ten years after the World Bank 
initiated discussions with the government and other donors on a sector-wide education 
plan, just one third of aid is being channelled through a common basket, the majority of 
missions, reports and reviews are not harmonised, and procurement remains heavily tied. 
This is not simply a case of some donors, such as the US and Japan, not ‘buying in’ to 
the harmonisation agenda. Many of the key proponents of pooling and harmonisation, 
such as the Danes, Norwegians and UK, continue to perform poorly on many key 
indicators. 
 
The weak capacity of the Zambian government, poor quality public financial 
management and political instability are undoubtedly factors in the mixed track record 
towards harmonisation and alignment. Several donors also cite the government’s failure 
to hold them to account with the Memoranda of Understanding, or to pro-actively 
demand information from donors, and argue that peer pressure amongst donors has 
been the catalyst for harmonisation. At the same time, the limited progress towards using 
country systems, coordinating approaches to government and improving the stability and 
predictability of aid suggest capacity weaknesses, cumbersome bureaucracy, and the 
wrong incentives within donor agencies. 
 
Despite a decade of efforts, the principal objective of harmonisation still seems 
ambiguous: is it primarily about reducing transaction costs and delivering cost efficiency 
for donors, or about improving the capacity of resource constrained recipient countries 
to deliver on their own goals? While it’s clear that donors will only subscribe to an 
agenda that is likely to benefit them, as well as recipients, and it is possible that ‘win-win’ 
measures exist to achieve both objectives, the needs of the Zambian government often 
appear to have figured as an afterthought among donors active in the education sector. 
There are strong arguments for reducing the number of donors in the education sector, 
establishing a clear division of labour between them, and moving many of the transaction 
costs ‘upstream’ out of sector planning discussions into donor-only meetings. At present, 
too many donors continue to provide often small and unpredictable sums of money to 
support their own priorities at the expense of government, or alternatively insist on 
micromanagement and excessive administrative burdens as a quid pro quo for basket 
funding and a more ‘country owned’ approach.  
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Aid transaction costs in the health sector: the case of Senegal 
Despite a relatively high per capita income by the standard of its West African 
neighbours, Senegal faces considerable human development challenges, standing 156
th 
out of 175 in the Human Development Index. Eight per cent of children die before their 
first birthday, one quarter of children are malnourished, and immunisation coverage is 
declining. Despite 4.8% of GDP being spent on health care through a mix of public and 
private spending, the health system is in a poor condition, especially in the Casamance 
region where it has been damaged by low-level conflict. There are just 10 doctors per 
100,000 people, and over 40% of births are without any medical support. It’s estimated 
that between one half and a third of the population are unable to afford essential drugs. 
The HIV-AIDS infection rate is low by regional standards, and is an important success 
story for the country.
9 
 
Senegal is a major aid recipient, with ODA flows upward of $400m in recent years, 
equivalent in 2002 to 9.2% of national income and 45% of public expenditure. In the 
health sector, donors account for approximately one third of all funding. In volume 
terms, the largest donors are the France, the World Bank, EC, Japan and the USA. 
Twelve donors are currently active in the health sector. 
     
Background 
In 1997, the World Bank launched a $35m Integrated Health Sector Development 
Project designed to run to 2002 in three regions. The project focused on health sector 
human resource management, and on preparing the central ministry for decentralisation. 
The IHSD was introduced in the context of a fragmented donor approach to the sector, 
with over twenty donor projects and no effective overall government health policy or 
vision.
10 More generally, donor interventions were characterised by low implementation 
levels, with the absence of an IMF programme, and weak public financial management 
cited by donors as key obstacles.
11 During the project identification and preparation 
stages, the Bank launched discussions with the government and other donors about 
whether to proceed with an investment project or a broader sector investment 
programme. 
 
The Bank resolved to press ahead with a sector investment programme, based on signals 
of donor willingness to participate, and on the government’s preparedness to develop a 
long term policy framework for health reform, building on the earlier 1991 policy (the 
government had already produced a national and district level health development plan at 
this stage, generating concerns about parallel processes amongst some government 
officials). Progress towards harmonisation around a country-led strategy proved slow, 
however, and individual donor projects continued to be the main funding modality. In 
1997 a five year Programme de Developpement Integre du Secteur de la Sante et de 
l’Action Sociale d’Investissement Sectoriel (PDIS) was launched, based on the new Plan 
National De Developpement Sanitaire et Social de Senegal (PNDS). 
 
Progress towards a Sector Wide Approach 
In 2004, the second phase of the PDIS was launched, running to 2008 – with 2003 as the 
transitional year to complete projects started under phase 1, which a donor financed 
evaluation had described as unsatisfactory. The PDIS is now described by several donors 
                                                 
9 UNDP. 2003. Senegal Human Development Report. 
10 Johansson, R. 2000. Education and Health in sub-Saharan Africa: A review of Sector Wide 
Approaches. World Bank.  
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as a Sector Wide Approach, and is intended to coordinate donor inventions and funding 
in line with nationally designed objectives and work plans.  
 
The PDIS is nominally linked to Senegal’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, approved 
in early 2003. However, the status of the PRSP remains unclear – with many government 
officials seeing it as a donor document – and the health goals in it are not widely 
disseminated. Senegal also lacks a Medium Term Expenditure Framework, and ongoing 
donor concerns about the quality of the budget planning process are cited as a reason for 
holding back a more programmatic approach to aid. 
 
Reports differ as to whether a separate coordination mechanism for donors exists in the 
health sector. The WHO has reportedly taken over this function from the EC, although 
the fact it is not a party to the PDIS raises questions about its relevance to the sector 
plan. It is also unclear how often this group meetings. There is also a wider donor 
coordination group. However, this reportedly only meets occasionally, donor 
participation is patchy, and there’s little interaction between this group and government.
12 
The three principal mechanisms for monitoring and planning the PDIS are Follow up 
Internal Committee Meetings, Joint Supervision Missions, and Annual Reviews. The 
Follow Up Committee is a joint MoH-donor group that meets once every three months 
to review plan implementation, approve activity reports from the technical directorates 
and regional education offices, and liase with the procurement branch of the ministry on 
TA expenditures. Joint supervision missions have now been agreed between the 
programmatic donors and the MoH, with a different region selected for each mission 
visit. 
 
The PDIS review is undertaken annually by the Ministry of Health and relevant donors, 
who discuss the forward-looking budget proposals and the progress for the past year. 
Annual Work Plans are drawn from the regional and district health plans, since the 
system is heavily decentralised, with most budget and management decisions devolved to 
the local level, where elected health committees oversee the operation of facilities. There 
is no basket funding under the PDIS (there’s currently no budget support for Senegal), 
although there’s some limited pooling into a current account at the district level for 
recurrent expenditures, with disbursements recorded separately. Most donor funding, 
however, is projectised and provided in parallel to government processes, and except for 
small expenditures must be signed off by the Ministry of Finance before being released 
to cover their individual programme costs in the PDIS. Donor-financed consultants, 
together with government officials in the Ministry of Health General Administration and 
Equipment Directorate (GAED) are responsible for SWAp finances. This cumbersome 
process, together with co-financing arrangements that ignore different budget cycles for 
government and donors, have been cited as key reasons for widespread delays in aid 
releases, with actual disbursements for the period 1998-2002 at 45% of total donor 
commitments. Slow and partial disbursement into PDIS has been given as the main 
reason for postponement of the last national immunisation campaign, against a backdrop 
of falling child immunisation in Senegal.
13  
 
Although donors cite a lack of transparency and weak budget systems as obstacles to 
more aid and fewer strings attached, donor commitments to the sector have increased 
steadily over the life time of the PDIS, from $67m in 1998 to $137m in 2001. The most 
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active donors have also committed to moving towards pooled funding over the course of 
the second phase to 2008. Aid predictability remains weak, with only the World Bank 
and UNICEF making multi-year commitments to the health sector. Audits have been 
carried out by individual donors on their commitments to the PDIS, rather than of the 
overall programme. The World Bank spent $100,000 on audits over the course of the 
first phase, and the African Development Bank over $30,000. More recently, an internal 
control unit has been established in the GAED to manage audit requests from donors. 
 
Table 1: Donor Participation in the PDIS 
Active Nominally  engaged  Non-participating 
World Bank 












Source: IHSD 2003 
 
The number of donors supporting the Senegal health SWAp varies, depending on who is 
asked. According to the World Bank, 12 donors are engaged, whereas other evaluations 
suggest just four donors including the Bank consider themselves fully on board (see table 
1). In the absence of any formal agreement such as a Memorandum of Understanding 
between government and donors, the parameters of the SWAp, and what that demands 
of donors, are necessarily vague. 
 
The Ministry of Health staffs the implementation unit for the PDIS – although this is 
heavily donor-funded and operates in many respects as a traditional Project 
Implementation Unit – and is responsible for implementing the plan and coordinating 
donor interventions. Each donor with a ‘programmatic’ relation with the MoH (World 
Bank, African Development Bank, EU and Denmark) has its own representative inside 
the PDIS unit, responsible for regular coordination between the PDIS and the donor – 
mirroring the projectised approach used by donors outside the SWAp. This group of 
donor-dedicated consultants, the ‘Support and Follow Up Team’, has seen its annual 
costs almost quadruple over the course of the PDIS to $1.5m, as it has taken on a key 
analytical role in driving the reforms.  
 
The PDIS unit drafts sector budgets and agrees individual donor contributions, although 
these tend to be re-statements of what each donor has already decided to do in the 
sector. Where the MoH has attempted to direct donor activities more strongly, donors 
have often objected, thereby delaying implementation.
14 This is cited as one reason for 
programme overrun in the first phase to 2002. The ability of government to take a more 
directive role in relation to the donors is expected to increase if a new budget financing 
system, including a Medium Term Expenditure Framework, is adopted. A new 
Performance Management System is also expected to be operational in early 2005, 
although it has not proved possible to get donor agreement on common procurement 
and reporting procedures. As a result, the Programme Management Manual contains 
only very general targets and indicators, for which several donors criticised it in 
interviews. Until or unless some common financial and reporting systems can be agreed, 
harmonisation efforts seem to be limited largely to inter-agency communication, with 
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donors avoiding outright duplication of one another’s activities, rather than any 
meaningful coordination.  
 
Wider harmonisation efforts 
Senegal is a Strategic Partnership with Africa (SPA) country pilot, part of donor efforts 
through the OECD-DAC to accelerate harmonisation in 13 major aid recipients. The 
SPA countries are expected to benefit from changes in donor practice aimed at 
increasing donor alignment, reducing recipient transaction costs and enhancing national 
capacity in public financial management. However, the slow progress in the health sector 
since 1997 is reflected more widely in donor practices. A recent DAC survey of progress 
showed that donors have yet to start routinely sharing information among themselves 
and with government, which is a necessary condition of progress towards coordination. 
For example, over half of all donors in Senegal are currently failing to disclose 
information on actual disbursements, or providing indicative aid commitments beyond 
the current financial year. Just one donor, the World Bank, is sharing country analytical 
work. 
 
There are clearly weaknesses in both the government and donor approach to tackling aid 
transaction costs. Despite widespread complaints in government about onerous donor 
procedures, late disbursements and operational fragmentation, and demands from the 
Ministry of Finance for more pooled support, Senegal has so far failed to draft any plan 
for harmonisation, as happened in Zambia with the Memoranda of Understanding. Some 
principles for increasing aid effectiveness have been articulated in PRS-related 
documents, such as the Country Financial Accountability Assessment, although this was 
commissioned and authored by the World Bank and African Development Bank, raising 
questions about the depth of country ownership of this agenda. The Poverty Reduction 
Strategy itself is seen by most donors as an inadequate basis for alignment, since it is 
short on specific objectives and goals, lacks measurable progress indicators, and is not 
well linked to the budget. 
  
 
As in Zambia, donor and government perceptions about the extent to which aid goes 
through country systems differs widely. Whereas government respondents to the DAC 
survey claimed that approximately 10% of aid used country systems, donors cited 
between 30-40%, depending on the activity. Monitoring, evaluations and missions 
continue to be carried out individually by donors, with the exception of some joint 
Figure 1: Donor missions in 2003
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supervision missions in health. In 2003, Senegal received 150 missions, excluding the UN 
agencies, IMF, African Development Bank and several of the smaller bilateral donors - 
with the World Bank alone accounting for almost one mission a week (see figure 1).  
 
Conclusions 
Over the past seven years, progress towards more effective aid for health, with lower 
transaction costs for Senegal, has been exceptionally slow. At present, ‘Sector Wide 
Approach’ is a misnomer for donor practices in the health sector, as they continue to 
pursue a piecemeal and administratively cumbersome approach to funding. There are a 
number of likely reasons for this, including the government’s failure to make clear 
demands of the donors, and the failure of donors to create the skills and incentives 
needed to communicate and coordinate better. The upshot of this failure is seen in the 
weak response to health challenges, exemplified by delays to the national child 
immunisation campaign because of slow donor disbursements. 
 
This lack of progress is especially disappointing given that Senegal is wealthier, more 
politically stable and has greater administrative and technical capacity than most of its 
West African neighbours. The fact that a small number of donors – comprising France, 
the EC and the MDBs - dominates the health sector, should make significant strides 
towards coordination and harmonisation feasible within this inner group. One factor in 
this not happening so far may be the excessively close association of the sector plan with 
the World Bank, which has identified and prepared many of the key initiatives in the 
plan, and financed much of the analysis – leaving other donors reluctant to be 
coordinated in order to achieve success in what’s perceived as a Bank programme, and 
government ownership diluted. 
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Summary conclusions from two case studies 
The two case studies of aid transaction costs under Sector Wide Approaches in Zambia 
and Senegal highlight a large gap between donors’ stated ambitions to improve aid 
effectiveness, and the incoherent, inefficient reality on the ground. The two examples in 
this paper are important because in many respects they represent the outer limits of 
donor progress towards implementing the harmonisation and coordination agenda that 
was set at the Monterrey Financing for Development summit, and through the OECD-
DAC. Inevitably, this raises serious questions about whether donors are well placed to 
deliver far-reaching changes in aid planning and delivery, or whether a radical rethink is 
needed of the aid architecture that underlies many of the current inefficiencies. The key 
conclusions are as follows: 
 
•  Donor concerns about transaction costs are often driven more by the cost to 
themselves of doing business, rather than by concerns about the administrative and 
political impact of aid on recipients’ own systems. At the very least, donors are 
unlikely to support an agenda that simply moves transaction costs ‘upstream’ from 
recipients to donors, which helps explain why there are so few cases of delegated 
cooperation, or ‘silent partnership’ between donors. Mutually beneficial reform 
options urgently need to be identified. 
•  Despite the promotion of Sector Wide Approaches and budget support by like-
minded donors such as the UK and Nordics, there is no clear evidence that 
transaction costs are lowered under these more macro modalities. There is some 
evidence that costs are redistributed and concentrated, with an increasing burden 
falling on senior staff at central ministry level. This concentration of transaction costs 
can expose capacity constraints in recipient governments, which donors often 
respond to with Technical Assistance and micro-managed policy advice. Therefore 
what begins as an effort to enhance country ownership can end by significantly 
eroding it. In sum, the equation between reduced transaction costs and macro 
modalities needs to be revisited - at least so long as donors insist on 
micromanagement and heavy fiduciary safeguards in exchange for direct budget and 
sector support. 
•  Because some donors – including the two largest bilateral agencies, the US and Japan 
– do not support the harmonisation and sector wide agendas, recipients tend to end 
up managing two quite distinct sets of transaction costs at project and programme 
level. This also happens because even the most enthusiastic poolers tend to retain 
some project presence at sector level. As a general rule, recipients are managing more 
financial transactions per sector than there are active donors. 
•  The harmonisation agenda has so far failed to question the number of actors at 
country and sector level. In both cases, a large number of agencies – often providing 
small sums of money – create major obstacles to effective coordination. Recipients 
could be relieved of many aid transaction costs by donors agreeing to limit the 
number of agencies and establishing a clear division of labour across and within 
countries. Recipients should also be encouraged to follow the lead established by 
some Low-income Countries such as India, and establish minimum entry criteria for 
donors. The risks of this course of action would be reduced if donors acted 
collectively, perhaps starting with the 13 SPA countries. 
•  In both case studies, donor disbursements tend to be late, partial and unpredictable. 
This undermines effective planning for the Millennium Development Goals, and 
carries direct costs for people living in poverty. Donors tend to cite country 
shortcomings, but donors’ own procedures seem to be an equal if not greater 
problem. Synchronising donor releases with recipient budgets, making multi-annual   17
commitments, informing recipients of actual disbursements, and wherever possible 
channelling funds through country systems are necessary to address this problem. 
•  There are significantly differing donor and recipient perceptions about what is and is 
not a country system. This partly reflects the fact that many country systems are 
identified, designed and implemented with donor funds in order to satisfy donor 
demands. Many interventions, for example to improve financial transparency and 
accountability, are necessary to ensure that aid and public money is used well. 
However, donor dominance of institutional reform processes in many LICs 
undermines ownership and sustainability. Pooled technical assistance budgets and a 
more hands-off approach to the design of country systems are needed address this 
problem. 
•  There has been some limited progress in both the case studies towards inter-donor 
and donor-government communication and coordination, especially around missions 
and reporting. Harmonised procurement and use of country financial systems pose a 
much greater challenge. Donors often cite administrative and legal obstacles to using 
country systems, which usually reflect tied aid policies and political concerns about 
demonstrating value for money and financial accountability to publics and 
parliaments in the North. Ultimately, progress will depend on whether poverty 
reduction, or commercial and political objectives drive aid programmes.   
•  None of the challenges identified in this study are new, which suggests that the main 
barriers to progress are the structure, culture and incentives of the aid system. At 
present, donors are accountable mainly to themselves for delivering on the 
harmonisation agenda. The donor system is fragmented and inefficient, but there is 
also a powerful shared interest in maintaining the status quo, partly because of political 
pressures in donor countries and also because of internal interests in aid 
bureaucracies. The weakness and fragmentation of aid recipients further hinders 
reform efforts. Yet aid reform cannot be disembodied, and meaningful changes in 
how aid is delivered must necessarily change the aid architecture.    18
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